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PRESERVING THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
ADMINISTRATIVE-INDUSTRIAL STATE
RODNEY A. SMOLLA*
I. MEMBERSHIP AND PRIVILEGE IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE-INDUSTRIAL STATE
A. The Importance of Affiliation
Most Americans draw much of their economic and social suste-
nance from their affiliations with public and private institutions.'
Middle and upper class Americans largely define their identities in
institutional terms, thinking of themselves as "members" of one
sort or another-as employees of corporations or public agencies,
as students or professors at universities, as partners or associates
in law firms-and membership, it is thought, has its privileges.
B. The Public Image of Thriving Civil Liberties
With no apparent sense of contradiction, most Americans also
think of themselves as enjoying a healthy degree of civil liberty.
We live in a country with a Bill of Rights, and 200 years after its
enactment, the Bill of Rights seems to be thriving. To use the sum-
mer of 1989 as a sounding, for example, Americans might point to
a basketful of Supreme Court decisions reaffirming the first
amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.2 Freedom of speech
continues to be one of the liveliest areas of constitutional adjudica-
tion, and the Supreme Court in its most recent term made it even
livelier, with decisions involving flag burning,3 dial-a-porn,4 publi-
* James Gould Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Institute of Bill of
Rights Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A., Yale Uni-
versity, 1975; J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1978.
1. See Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 295, 296
(1990).
2. See, e.g., infra notes 3-8.
3. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
4. Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
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cation of the names of rape victims,5 child pornography,' regula-
tion of the volume of rock concerts' and defamation."
On balance, free speech interests fared very well: The Court held
that the first amendment protected desecration of the flag to com-
municate a message of protest,9 that it protected the right of a
newspaper to publish the name of a rape victim the paper obtained
from a publicly released police report,10 that it prevented a state
from using its RICO statute to seize items from an adult bookstore
prior to any judicial determination that the items seized were ob-
scene," and that it prevented the Federal Communications Com-
mission from banning dial-a-porn messages that were indecent but
not obscene.' 2 Not every first amendment decision from the 1988-
89 term, it is true, was a free speech victory. The Court did hold,
for example, that the first amendment did not preclude regulation
of the volume of rock concerts in New York's Central Park, 3 and
it upheld a substantial damages award in a libel case brought by a
public official.'4 Nevertheless, with only those few decisions to
point to, the objective observer would have to conclude that in
1989 freedom of speech was in robust shape.
C. The Threat Posed by Conditions on Affiliation
To what extent, however, are Americans truly at leisure to enjoy
their Bill of Rights freedoms? Liberty may be circulating fresh and
free in the ambient atmosphere, but most Americans live in the
stuffier confines of institutions. To what extent, in modern life, is
institutional affiliation conditioned on the surrender of freedoms
that individuals would otherwise enjoy? If survival in the modern
administrative-industrial state is ultimately dependent upon mem-
bership in the vast interlocking network of public and private
5. The Florida Star v. BJF, 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
6. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633 (1989).
7. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
8. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
9. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
10. The Florida Star v. BJF, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (1989).
11. Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 929-30 (1989).
12. Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2832 (1989).
13. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2760 (1989).
14. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2699 (1989).
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agencies, corporations, and organizations, are Americans in 1989
less free or more free than in 1789? What limits exist on the condi-
tions that may be placed upon a private citizen's affiliation with
governmental agencies, such as accepting public benefits, going to
work at a government job, or attending a public school or univer-
sity? This Article explores those evolving limits in the context of
the public sector,15 limits that exert enormously significant influ-
ence on the degree of real Bill of Rights freedom in the modern
administrative-industrial state.
II. THE ELUSIVE JURISPRUDENCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR CONDITIONS
A. Direct versus Indirect Restrictions on Liberty
Government may directly restrict any Bill of Rights guarantee,
such as freedom of speech, by promulgating laws and regulations,
and imposing sanctions on anyone who violates those rules. Gov-
ernment may also, however, indirectly restrict liberties such as free
speech through the device of granting governmental benefits "with
strings attached." The strings are conditions exacted upon receipt
of the benefit, conditions that require the recipient to surrender
certain liberties in exchange for accepting the benefit.16
Is government permitted to do indirectly what it could not do
directly? A city could not, for example, pass a law saying that ev-
eryone in the city must be a Democrat, and that anyone who de-
clares himself or herself a Republican will be arrested and fined.
That would be a direct regulation of free speech and free associa-
tion, and an obvious violation of the first amendment. Similarly,
no city could enact a law making it illegal to discuss politics; such a
15. The scope of this Article is restricted to exploring limits placed on affiliation with
institutions in the public sector. A similar exploration, however, would be equally important
for the private sector. See infra text accompanying notes 180-88.
16. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 490 (1952); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 95-96 (1947), overruled on other grounds, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
17. Discrimination against speech on the basis of viewpoint is a virtual per se violation of
the first amendment. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989) ("If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
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direct abridgement of free speech would be an open and shut con-
stitutional violation."i
What if the city government, however, is controlled overwhelm-
ingly by popularly elected Democrats, with the city council, mayor
and all other major elective offices held by members of the Demo-
cratic Party, and those Democrats fill thousands of appointive city
jobs with other loyal Democrats?' Or what if the city government,
wanting to insulate its employees from the potential corruptions of
politics, forbids its employees from engaging in political activity,
including public discussion of political issues, as a condition of em-
ployment?20 Is the patronage system, in which a job seeker effec-
tively waives his right to join the party of his choice in return for a
place on the city payroll, as clearly unconstitutional as a rule re-
quiring all citizens to be members of a particular party? Is a
nonpolitical civil service system, in which a job seeker effectively
waives his right to participate in politics in return for a place on
the city payroll, as clearly unconstitutional as a rule forbidding all
citizens from discussing political matters?
The answer in each case is no. The constitutional legitimacy of
attaching these sorts of strings to the receipt of governmental ben-
efits is not intuitively obvious; the correct answer does not leap to
mind with instant certitude; we sense that the matter is more
murky, the analysis more complex. We may in the end decide that
18. Speech on political matters lies at the heart of the protections of the first amendment.
See, e.g., Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). A
debate exists over whether political speech is the only type of speech protected by the first
amendment, whether it is the "most preferred" of all genres of speech under the Constitu-
tion, or whether it is simply part of a larger class of speech enjoying "core" first amendment
shelter. See generally Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECti AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 92-95 (1948); R. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V.
LARRY FLYNT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL 230-32 (1988); Wellington, Freedom of Ex-
pression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1110-16 (1979). Whether or not other forms of speech qualify
for equally strong protection, however, "there is practically universal agreement that a ma-
jor purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
19. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding stringent state regu-
lation of political activities for state employees); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding prohibition of federal em-
ployees' participation in active political management or campaigning); see also infra text
accompanying notes 133-36.
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the government cannot engage in these indirect regulations of
speech, or that it may do so in some cases but not in others, but
the theory required to explain the results demands more intricate
structure.
B. The Right-Privilege Distinction
The intuition that attaching conditions to governmental benefits
is a matter different from direct regulation is traceable to one of
the oldest doctrines of American constitutional law, the "right-
privilege" distinction.21 The distinction is grounded in a dichotomy
between "rights" and mere "privileges." In their classic conception,
rights are interests held by individuals independent of the state.
Rights exist prior to the state; individuals possess rights from
birth, by virtue of their humanity, as entitlements of natural law,
as endowments from the Creator, or as liberties enjoyed by man in
his natural condition before the creation of government. The fram-
ers of the Constitution, following the social contract theory of the
philosopher John Locke,2" saw government as a voluntary compact
entered into by individuals to provide security for their rights.
Rights were thus not the creature of the state; rather, the state was
the creature, brought into existence by the people to secure rights
they already possessed. In the words of Thomas Jefferson's Decla-
ration of Independence: "[T]o secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed."2 Having created the government to secure
rights, the challenge is how to keep the government from abusing
its power and destroying the very rights it was founded to pre-
serve. In James Madison's words: "In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself."24
21. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti-
tutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
22. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Peardon ed. 1952).
23. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration was nominally
the work of the drafting committee of the Second Continental Congress, but Jefferson wrote
it virtually in its entirety.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cook ed. 1961).
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In contrast to rights, "privileges" are interests created by the
grace of the state and are dependent for their existence on the
state's sufferance. Privileges may take virtually any form. They
may be economic interests, such as a public job, welfare benefits, a
license to operate a business, an offer of admission to a state uni-
versity, or permits to dump pollutants into a river. Privileges may
also be noneconomic, such as permission for an alien to enter the
country, early release from imprisonment through pardon or pa-
role, transfer from one prison to another, or permission for an at-
torney to argue in a court other than in the state of his or her
admission.2"
The right-privilege distinction in American constitutional law
operated on the simple premise that government is not normally
entitled to restrict the enjoyment of rights, and that whenever it
attempts to do so, it must justify its efforts with the strongest of
reasons. In the official parlance of constitutional law, the curtail-
ment of rights will be sustained only if it can survive the "strict
scrutiny" test in a judicial challenge; the test requires the govern-
ment to demonstrate first, that its infringements are necessary to
serve "compelling" ends, and second, that the infringements are
"narrowly tailored" to achieve those ends.26
When the government attempts to restrict enjoyment of a privi-
lege, however, an entirely different analysis was traditionally ap-
plied. The government, it was said, could grant citizens privileges
on the condition that they surrender or curtail the exercise of con-
stitutional freedoms they would otherwise enjoy. The theory was
that every legal system must recognize a distinction between inter-
ests that are "vested" and legally protected, and interests that are
not. The distinction between "right" and "nonright" is implicit in
the very existence of a legal system. Privileges are not rights, the
25. See, e.g., Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463-64 (1981) (dis-
cussing parole as not implicating any "underlying right"); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441-42
(1979) (characterizing pro hac vice practice as a "privilege of appearing upon motion," but
"not a right granted either by statute or the Constitution"). See generally Smolla, The
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Pro-
testing Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1982).
26. See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989) (applying strict scru-
tiny in the context of free speech).
27. Smolla, supra note 25, at 74 n.19.
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theory went, but rather are public charity. Government, through
the political process, generates privileges as a form of public lar-
gess. In private transactions, the homespun wisdom is that beggars
cannot be choosers and gift horses are not to be looked in the
mouth; the giver may attach any conditions he pleases to the gift.
This elemental proposition should not change, it was thought,
when government is doing the giving.
The right-privilege distinction was undergirded by the belief
that conditions attached to government benefits did not implicate
civil liberties concerns, but rather were mundane economic trans-
actions. When the government dispensed privileges, it operated as
the proprietor of the public business, not as the regulator of pri-
vate conduct. Of course, the Bill of Rights applies when the gov-
ernment acts as the great pandemic policeman to restrict the citi-
zenry's freedom of action, but when the government is merely
going about its economic business-hiring employees, entering into
contracts, dispensing welfare payments, giving out seats in univer-
sities-the Bill of Rights may seem to many quite beside the point.
In effect, in the government's economic transactions, the taxpayers
are shareholders in the massive state corporation, and government
officials, as caretakers of the public treasury, should strike hard
bargains. s
C. The Influence of Holmes
One of the principal intellectual architects of the right-privilege
distinction was Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes, of course, was also
one of the earliest judicial exponents of a vigorous protection for
freedom of speech,29 so it is particularly interesting to see how, in
the mind of Holmes, a civil liberty such as free speech took on
entirely distinct hues in the context of conditions attached to
largess.
In a case decided before Holmes was elevated to the Supreme
Court from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he ad-
28. See infra text accompanying notes 36-40.
29. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205,
1303-20 (1983); Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514
(1981).
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dressed the constitutionality of restricting the free speech of gov-
ernment employees. In the 1892 case McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford,30 the city of New Bedford fired a police officer named
John McAuliffe for doing what Irish cops in those days were wont
to do-talking politics while walking the beat. McAuliffe chal-
lenged his dismissal as a violation of the first amendment. Holmes
dismissed McAuliffe's claim as if it bordered on the frivolous,
bluntly stating: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman." 31
In Holmes' view, McAuliffe's predicament was a simple matter
of contractual waiver. In contracts, people often surrender rights
that they would otherwise enjoy as part of the inducement to the
other side to join the bargain. As Holmes put it, there are "few
employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to sus-
pend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness
by the implied terms of his contract. 3 2 Quarreling with Holmes'
homespun wisdom is difficult. You have a constitutional right to sit
around and do nothing, and to speak your mind. But if you take a
job, you usually must agree to do your work and not mouth off to
the boss; this is as true when the boss is the government as when it
is a private business. McAuliffe, Holmes wrote, was like any other
employee: "[H]e takes the employment on the terms which are of-
fered him. ', 3
Holmes would use very much the same patterns of thought when
confronted with an asserted constitutional right to speak on public
property. In another decision he wrote while on the Massachusetts
high court, Commonwealth v. Davis,34 Holmes upheld an ordinance
that prohibited public speaking in a municipal park without a per-
mit from the mayor. Holmes reasoned that because the city owned
the park, it could establish rules for use of the park just like any
private landlord. If it wanted, the city could exclude access alto-
gether. Holmes reasoned further that the greater power to exclude
30. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
31. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
32. Id., 29 N.E. at 517-18.
33. Id., 29 N.E. at 518.
34. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd sub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43
(1897).
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access must include the lesser power to place conditions on access,
and thus the city could condition public speaking on obtaining a
permit from the mayor. Holmes did not think of this as a restric-
tion on Mr. Davis' freedom of speech, because he was free to speak
all he wanted. The first amendment guaranteed Davis a right to
speak only, not a right of entry onto property that was not his. The
United States Supreme Court reviewed Holmes' Davis opinion and
affirmed it, adopting Holmes' reasoning entirely. "'For the legisla-
ture absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a high-
way or public park,'" the Court stated, "'is no more an infringe-
ment of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of
a private house to forbid it in his house.' ,,35
Holmes did not seem concerned that the government might
abuse this power to place conditions on the receipt of benefits to
achieve harsh or unjust results. For Holmes, these were economic
transactions, governed by market forces and not subject to moral
concerns. The government was entitled to charge what the market
would bear. In an opinion he wrote while on the Supreme Court,
for example, Holmes dealt with whether financial conditions
placed on a corporation's permission to do business in Kansas were
too burdensome. 6 Holmes asked, "Now what has Kansas done?"37
His answer was that "[s]he simply has said to the company that if
it wants to do local business it must pay a certain sum of
money. '38 Holmes was apparently unconcerned with Kansas' possi-
ble extortionate abuse of its power, because he stated that "[ift
does not matter if the sum is extravagant.39 And in another opin-
ion, he elaborated: "In order to enter into most of the relations of
life people have to give up some of their Constitutional rights. If a
man makes a contract he gives up the Constitutional right that
previously he had to be free from the hamper that he puts upon
himself."4
35. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 162
Mass. at 511, 39 N.E. at 113).
36. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
40. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 497 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1990] 329
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
If Holmes' right-privilege distinction were accepted as sound,
the solutions to many of the civil liberties issues that so perplex us
today, particularly in the area of freedom of speech and free exer-
cise of religion, would be relatively effortless. For, in contemporary
times, free speech and free exercise of religion disputes arise con-
stantly in the context of conditions attached to public benefits. "x
Conscientious and consistent application of the right-privilege dis-
tinction would make these disputes easy to resolve: The govern-
ment would always win.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF LIMITS ON PUBLIC SECTOR CONDITIONS
A. Unraveling the Linguistics of Right and Privilege
If the government is not always to win in challenges to the con-
ditions it has attached to affiliation with governmental programs,
somehow holes must be punched in the seemingly seamless logic of
the right-privilege distinction. Could Holmes be wrong?
1. The manipulation of labels
The first line of attack against the right-privilege distinction is
to unmask it as a conclusory substitution of labels for analysis.
Merely naming an interest a "right" or a "privilege" does not ex-
plain why the name is accurate. How do we know what is a right
and what is a privilege? The government is perfectly capable of
manipulating the labels deceitfully to disguise its curtailment of a
"right" under the pretext of merely attaching conditions to a
"privilege."
2. Licensing rights versus licensing methods of exercise
A license is an interesting example. The Supreme Court has said
that there is a constitutional right to travel.42 May the state condi-
tion the exercise of that right on the possession of valid travel doc-
uments, such as a driver's license, passport, or visa? 43 The first
41. See supra text accompanying note 16.
42. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868).
43. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (involving revocation of passport); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (involving refusal of United States to issue passports for travel to
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amendment declares a constitutional right to speak. May govern-
ment condition that right on the possession of an appropriate
"speaker's license," such as a Federal Communications Commis-
sion license to broadcast over the radio waves?"'
The government might protest that these are disingenuous ques-
tions, questions that mischaracterize the nature of these forms of
licensure. A driver's license, for example, is not a traveler's license.
The state does not regulate travel as such when it determines who
is and is not fit to drive. Driving is a dangerous business, and as
superintendent of the public safety, the state may insure that
those who drive are minimally competent. The citizen may have a
constitutional right to travel; he has no constitutional right to
drive a motor vehicle. As every high school sophomore learns dur-
ing the obligatory visit by the local police officer to driver's educa-
tion class, driving is a privilege, not a right.
Denial of a passport may seem to burden travel with more bra-
zen directness. Unlike a driver's license, a passport appears to be a
true travel document. Yet like a driver's license, a passport is not a
prerequisite for travel; it merely facilitates travel in international
circles.4 5 The passport is an intercession of the Secretary of State
on behalf of the American citizen, reciting that "[t]he Secretary of
State of the United States of America hereby requests all whom it
may concern to permit the citizen/national of the United States
named herein to pass without delay or hindrance and in case of
need to give all lawful aid and protection."4 6 The citizen may
travel without his passport and take his chances. The citizen has a
right to travel, but no right to government help. Never mind that
it may be difficult to find an international carrier that will permit
Cuba); cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (involving due process requirements for sus-
pension of driver's license and therefore implicating right to travel).
44. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
45. The Court has distinguished between the rights to interstate travel and international
travel, refusing to give international travel the same constitutional protection it has ex-
tended to the fundamental right to travel within the United States. See, e.g., Haig, 453 U.S.
at 280; Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); see
also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (refusing to accept a constitutional challenge to
restriction on travel to Cuba).
46. From the text of a current United States passport. The Supreme Court has referred to
this as a "letter of introduction" issued by the sovereign. Haig, 453 U.S. at 306; see Zemel,
381 U.S. at 1.
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the citizen to board its craft without a passport. Never mind that
upon arrival at the foreign border the guards may demand an ap-
propriate passport and visa. Never mind that as a practical matter
a passport and international travel seem inextricably intertwined.
The passport is not an actual "license to travel" because it is not
an actual license at all.
In Haig v. Agee,4 Philip Agee, an American citizen, challenged
the revocation of his passport. Agee had been employed from 1957
to 1968 with the Central Intelligence Agency. He held a number of
key positions within the CIA, including responsibility for covert in-
telligence operations in foreign countries.48 Agee bolted from the
Agency and the country, and took up residence in West Germany.
In 1974, he called a press conference in London to announce his
"campaign to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operat-
ing."'49 Agee then set out to disclose the names of agents located
throughout the world, and to release other classified information
concerning CIA operations. Because of his activities, Agee's pass-
port was revoked by the Secretary of State.
The Supreme Court upheld the revocation of Agee's passport,
notwithstanding the fact that it burdened his ability to travel and
that the burden was imposed because of the content of his speech.
"Revocation of a passport undeniably curtails travel,"50 the Court
held. This revocation, however, was merely a revocation of the doc-
ument issued by the government to make travel easier. As the
Court put it in Califano v. Aznavorian,51 one must keep in mind
"the crucial difference between the freedom to travel internation-
ally and the right of interstate travel. '52
An FCC license may seem at first trickier business. Without a
driver's license, one may still walk to the store; without a broad-
caster's license one cannot transmit at all. Today, the assertion
that licensing of printing presses or movie houses is a "prior re-
straint" of speech that cuts at the core of the first amendment
47. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
48. Id. at 283.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 306.
51. 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
52. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
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would be beyond contest." Such prior restraints are presumptively
unconstitutional and are almost always struck down. 4 They re-
strain the underlying right to speak, and the courts will not hear
the government pretend that it is merely withholding its affirma-
tive help by not granting the "privilege" of a license.
Yet the government will still prevail in the, broadcasting license
context. With the passage of legislation bringing the FCC into exis-
tence, Congress metaphorically "condemned" the airwaves, turning
all broadcast frequencies into federal property. 5 Once one ac-
knowledges this public acquisition of the broadcast spectrum, the
government's case for licensing users becomes indistinguishable
from Holmes' position in Commonwealth v. Davis."6 In the Davis
case the government property was a municipal park; in the FCC
case the property is the electro-magnetic spectrum. In either case
property is property, and the government as landlord may exclude
whom it wishes, or condition entry on whatever requirements it
chooses to set. At some point, however, these lines become too thin
to bear weight, and the government goes past merely failing to fa-
cilitate the exercise of the right to the more aggressive practice of
presuming to license the exercise of the underlying right itself.
This line was crossed, in the context of travel, in the case of Ed-
wards v. California.57 In Edwards, the Supreme Court invalidated
a California statute making it a misdemeanor to bring into, or to
assist in bringing into, California "'any indigent person who is not
a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person.' ",58
The statute was the product of many of the same impulses that
lead to modern integration controls. Popularly called the "Okie
53. See, e.g., Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Kingsley Books v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 457 (1938).
54. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945).
55. This "condemnation" of the broadcast spectrum was, to be sure, metaphorical, but
regulation of broadcasting "in the public interest" has been grounded traditionally in the
concept of "spectrum scarcity" and the power of Congress to allocate spectrum space
through its agent, the FCC, as trustee of the public. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
56. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), afrd sub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43
(1897); see supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
57. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
58. Id. at 171 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 2615 (repealed 1965)).
1990]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
law," the California statute was enacted to stem the tide of dust
bowl migration." Like suburbanites who argue that black entry
will cause their neighborhoods to deteriorate, 60 California argued
that "the huge influx of migrants into California in recent years
has resulted in problems of health, morals, and especially finance,
the proportions of which are staggering."'"
The Court recognized California's dilemma, but nonetheless
struck down the statute, stating that the Constitution prohibits
"attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from diffi-
culties common to all of them by restraining the transportation of
persons and property across its borders."62 The Court noted the
strong temptation for a state to attempt to "gain a momentary res-
pite from the pressure of events by the simple expedient of shut-
ting its gates to the outside world," 63 but declared that "'[tihe
Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philoso-
phy less parochial in range.' ",64
Edwards involved interstate travel within the country; the pass-
port cases involved international travel. In refusing to extend the
Edwards principle to international travel, 5 the Supreme Court has
effectively held that clauses, meant to unify the nation, such as the
commerce clause, and privileges and immunities clause, operate
only internal to the United States; they have no export value.
From the perspective of the right-privilege distinction and licens-
ing, however, the key fact is that California's border check in Ed-
wards, and the state's requirement of proof of employment,
amounted to direct licensing of the right to travel into California, a
right not dependent on the grace of California for its existence.
California presumed to act as if it were a foreign nation to dust
bowl Oklahomans. But Oklahomans were entitled to California cit-
izenship as a matter of choice by virtue of their citizenship in the
59. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 315-16 (11th ed. 1985).
60. See Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the
1980's, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947 (1985); Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitu-
tionality of Benign Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981
DUKE L.J. 891.
61. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 173-74 (quoting Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)).
65. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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larger American polity, and thus to license entry into California
was to license directly the right to travel itself.
To assert that international travel is somehow different is to beg
the essential question. Why is it different? The Court's explana-
tion of the purported differences has always been lame and con-
clusory, depending on the quick fix of the right-privilege distinc-
tion to sustain it. 66 Treating the government's power to restrict
international travel with greater deference than its power to re-
strict domestic travel may be supported legitimately, but the na-
ked language of "right" and "privilege" is too inarticulate to be
satisfying. For example, international travel may implicate na-
tional security or foreign relations in a manner that domestic
travel does not. If those are the grounds that really distinguish the
cases, however, then the government should bear the burden of
persuasion that the grounds are sufficiently weighty to justify the
imposition of restraints on travel. The onus on the government in
meeting its burden should not change when one moves from do-
mestic travel to international travel. That the government may be
better equipped to meet its onus in international cases is
fine-more power to it-but for the Court to largely excuse it from
the exercise is simply to elevate form over substance.
B. The Religion Cases: The First Major Assault
The first powerful assault on the right-privilege distinction grew
out of the religion clauses. In Sherbert v. Verner,6 7 a private em-
ployer discharged a Seventh-Day Adventist because she would not
work on Saturday, the Sabbath of her faith. South Carolina denied
her unemployment compensation because she had refused to ac-
cept "suitable work. ' 68 South Carolina was thus simply attaching a
condition to the receipt of unemployment benefits: Before one is
eligible, one must demonstrate that no suitable work is obtainable.
The state took the position that her firing was her own fault; work
was available and she simply would not perform it.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
67. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
68. Id. at 401.
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The Supreme Court held that South Carolina's actions violated
the Constitution." To "condition the availability of benefits upon
this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her
religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitu-
tional liberties," the Court held.7 0 The state could not exact these
penalties on free exercise of religion unless justified by compelling
state interests. South Carolina could proffer only the lame fear
that it would be inundated with fraudulent claimants feigning reli-
gious objections to Saturday work." The Court found no evidence
in the record to support the state's fears of such malingering or
deceit, and said that even if the state could muster such evidence,
it must demonstrate also that no alternative measures would com-
bat the abuses without infringing on constitutional rights; the
Court struck down South Carolina's actions.7 1
The Court added an interesting wrinkle to the Sherbert princi-
ple in Thomas v. Review Boards.7 Eddie Thomas was a Jehovah's
Witness who worked in a steel foundry. He was transferred from
the fabricated sheet roll department, which was being closed down,
to the department that fabricated turrets for military tanks.
Thomas objected to producing steel for weaponry, and when he
found that no other positions in the company were available, he
quit. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Thomas could not re-
ceive state unemployment benefits.7 4 The Indiana Court thought
that Thomas had been inconsistent in his beliefs because he would
not work on turrets, but would work on rolled steel, a raw material
that went into the production of, among many other things,
tanks.7 5 Other Jehovah's Witnesses, the Indiana Court noted, had
not found it impossible to work in steel plants because of religious
scruples. 6 Finally, the Indiana Court bluntly observed that the
state unemployment compensation system "is not intended to fa-
69. Id. at 410.
70. Id. at 406.
71. Id. at 407.
72. Id. at 407.
73. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
74. 271 Ind. 233, 391 N.E.2d 1127 (1979).
75. Id. at 240-44, 391 N.E.2d at 1131-33.
76. Id. at 243, 391 N.E.2d at 1133.
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cilitate changing employment or to provide relief for those who
quit work voluntarily for personal reasons.""
The Supreme Court reversed.7 It admonished the Indiana Su-
preme Court, saying the court's function was not to police the rea-
sonableness or logical consistency of religious beliefs.7 9 Thomas
had drawn an intelligible line between working on rolled sheet
steel and working on tank turrets, and the fact that he happened
to feel more strongly about it than some other Jehovah's Witnesses
was Thomas' business.8 0 Everything in the record supported the
sincerity of his religious objections, and that was what mattered.8
Reinforcing Sherbert, the Court described the dilemma facing Ed-
die Thomas as "a choice between fidelity to religious belief or ces-
sation of work.""2 This, the Court held, was coercive.
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his be-
havior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.8 3
The Indiana Court's protest that the state scheme was not in-
tended to compensate persons who quit jobs for "personal reasons"
did not impress the Supreme Court. Thomas had quit for personal
reasons, it is true, but for a particular species of personal rea-
sons-religious personal reasons-and to condition his receipt of
public benefits on compromising those religious reasons was
unconstitutional.
In both Sherbert and Thomas, the employer caused the conflict
between work and religious belief by altering the work schedule or
conditions after the employee had begun the job. In Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Commission,4 the employee modified her
religious beliefs after taking a job, by converting to the Seventh-
Day Adventist Church, which rendered her no longer willing to
77. Id. at 237, 391 N.E.2d at 1129.
78. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981).
79. Id. at 715.
80. Id. at 715-16.
81. Id. at 716.
82. Id. at 717.
83. Id. at 717-18.
84. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
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work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. The Su-
preme Court held that Florida violated the Constitution by deny-
ing her unemployment benefits, and that the constitutional analy-
sis recognized no distinction when the employee, not the employer,
was the agent of the change that brought about the conflict. 5
This line of cases recently gathered even more momentum in
Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,86 in which
William Frazee refused a temporary retail position offered him by
Kelly Services because the job would have required him to work on
Sunday. Illinois followed the typical pattern of denying benefits to
persons who, "without good cause," refuse "suitable work."8 Fra-
zee was not a member of any established church or religious body,
but merely referred to himself as a generic "Christian." The state
of Illinois thought that was enough to take him outside the Sher-
bert, Thomas and Hobbie cases, and denied him benefits. Signifi-
cantly, Illinois did not contest the personal sincerity of Frazee's
religious objections to working on Sunday.
The Supreme Court once again held that denial of unemploy-
ment benefits violated the free exercise clause:
Undoubtedly membership in an organized religious denomina-
tion, especially one with a specific tenet forbidding members to
work on Sunday, would simplify the problem of identifying sin-
cerely held religious beliefs, but we reject the notion that to
claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be
responding to the commands of a particular religious
organization.8
In combination, Sherbert, Thomas, Hobbie and Frazee establish
a constitutional principle of exceptional potency. A state may not
deny unemployment benefits to persons who refuse work for sin-
cere religious reasons. It does not matter whether the individual's
beliefs are common or idiosyncratic, whether the individual is cor-
rect or incorrect in assuming that the religious sect to which he or
she belongs in fact proscribes the work involved, whether the con-
flict comes about because of changes brought on by the employer
85. Id. at 144.
86. 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
87. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 433 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
88. Frazee, 109 S. Ct. at 1517.
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or the employee, or whether the employee's religious scruples are
drawn from a recognized established religious sect or merely from
the employee's own private religious convictions. The sweep and
resiliency of this rule are even more striking when one considers
that the constitutional norm that developed could very well have
been precisely the opposite.
Under the cold logic of the right-privilege distinction, all of the
claimants in these cases would lose. Holmes would insist that al-
though they may have a constitutional right to practice their reli-
gion, no constitutional right to have the government subsidize that
practice exists. If they really have the courage of their religious
convictions, they should be willing to pay the price, forgoing their
jobs and public compensation as matters of religious principle. The
state, after all, was not forcing the Seventh-Day Adventists to
work on Saturday, or even to work at all. Nor was the state forcing
Mr. Thomas to work on tank turrets. One may admire these plain-
tiffs' decisions to forgo gainful employment out of religious con-
science without necessarily accepting the view that the taxpayers
must underwrite them. Holmes would find no difficulty with the
view advanced by the states in these cases that there is no consti-
tutional right to unemployment benefits, and consequently that
the beneficiaries must take the benefits on the terms that they are
offered, which may include a willingness to accept work notwith-
standing personal, and even religious, sacrifice. But the Sherbert
line of cases have not accepted Holmes' logic; indeed they go so far
as to say that once the state decides to create an unemployment
compensation system, it must include public subsidies for the free
exercise of religion as part of the overhead of the system.
C. Public Property: A More Intricate Problem
A second major attack on the right-privilege distinction has
taken place through the evolution of "public forum" first amend-
ment jurisprudence. The Court has abandoned Holmes' simplistic
view that the government may absolutely exclude speech from its
own property, just like a private landlord."9 Unlike the religion
clause cases emanating from Sherbert v. Verner,90 however, the
89. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 67-88.
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analysis in the government property cases has proven far more
intricate.
The Supreme Court has recognized three distinct categories of
public fora. The first, the "traditional" or "quintessential" public
forum, consists of places such as streets or parks that "have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."'" Con-
tent-based regulation of speech in a traditional public forum is
governed by the strict scrutiny test; the regulation must be neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and must be narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.2 Content-neutral regulation of the
time, place and manner of speech in a traditional public forum is
permitted if it serves an "important," or "significant," or "substan-
tial" governmental interest, is narrowly tailored to achieve the in-
terest, and leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication."
The second category is the "designated" open public forum. This
category consists of public property opened by the state for indis-
criminate use as a place for expressive activity. If the government
treats a piece of public property as if it were a traditional public
forum, intentionally opening it up to the public at large for assem-
bly and speech, it will be bound by the same standards applicable
to a traditional public forum. 4 Content-based regulation of speech
in a designated open public forum must thus satisfy the strict scru-
tiny test."5 A state is "not required to indefinitely retain the open
character of the facility,"9 6 but as long as it does so, the strict scru-
tiny test applies.9 7
91. Hague v. CI0, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
92. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Ca-
rey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
93. See, e.g., id. at 46; United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
535-36 (1980).
94. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
95. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802-03
(1985).
96. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
97. Id.
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The same legal standards for regulating speech thus apply to
Category I "traditional" fora, and Category II "designated" fora.
The only difference between the two categories is that the govern-
ment has no control over the status of a traditional forum-the
United States could not take the Washington Mall "out of circula-
tion" as a traditional public forum-but the government may by
designation move a public facility in or out of Category II status.9 8
The third category is the "nonpublic" forum. Category III fora
consist of publicly owned facilities that have been dedicated to use
for either communicative or noncommunicative purposes, but that
have never been designated for indiscriminate expressive activity
by the general public. The "First Amendment does not guarantee
access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the
government." 99
The content-based regulation of speech in Category III fora is
not governed by the strict scrutiny test, but by a "reasonable
nexus" standard. The government "may reserve the forum for its
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the reg-
ulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress ex-
pression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view."'100 Entire classes of speech thus may be excluded from a
nonpublic forum. Those classes may be identified by content, as
long as the exclusion is reasonable in light of the purpose of the
forum, and there is no discrimination among viewpoints within a
class. "Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on
subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum
and are viewpoint neutral."'01
The difficulty in modern public forum law is determining
whether a facility falls within Category II, and is thus subject to
strict scrutiny, or Category III, and subject to the significantly
more lax reasonable nexus test. The nature of this characterization
problem is further illuminated by examining two parallel modern
98. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
99. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981).
100. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added).
101. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49) (emphasis
added).
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right-privilege problems involving free speech: one in public
schools, the other in public employment.
D. Public Schools
Although first amendment rights are not shed "at the school-
house gate, "102 a specialized body of first amendment jurispru-
dence has come to surround public secondary and elementary
schools. Students do not relinquish their rights to free speech as a
condition of free education, but "free speech" does not mean the
same thing for children in public schools that it means for adults
in the general community.
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,0 3 the Supreme
Court upheld content-based restrictions on a high school newspa-
per that would have been clearly impermissible if applied to a pri-
vately owned newspaper outside the school context.1 04 Rejecting
the argument that Hazelwood East High School was a public fo-
rum, the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to the school's ac-
tions: "The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of
streets, parks, and other traditional public forums. ' 105 If public
school facilities are open public fora, the Court reasoned, they be-
come so "only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice'
opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general pub-
lic,' or by some segment of the public, such as student organiza-
tions.'106 But "[i]f the facilities have instead been reserved for
other intended purposes, 'communicative or otherwise,' then no
public forum has been created, and school officials may impose
reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and
other members of the school community.' 0 7 In an extremely sig-
nificant elaboration on Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association,'"8 the Court held that when the school has
not created an open Category II public forum, the school may
102. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
103. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
104. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
105. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. at 267.
106. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983)) (citations omitted).
107. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7).
108. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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"'disassociate itself' "1O9 from speech for almost any reasonable
purpose, including the maintenance of neutrality, even when the
speech concerns core first amendment issues. The school may
therefore disassociate itself from "any position other than neutral-
ity on matters of political controversy.""'
This "public school first amendment law" contains two general
themes that illustrate the continuing residual power of right-privi-
lege thinking: Freedom of speech restraints on government are less
strict in the context of public schools, and establishment of reli-
gion restraints are more strict. Normal freedom of speech princi-
ples do not apply with full force in the context of schools; rather,
the government retains substantially greater latitude in regulating
speech on school property than it enjoys in most other first amend-
ment contexts. This more relaxed free speech standard vindicates
the unique governmental interest in schools as the transmitters of
public values, which the government as teacher must inculcate,
and that mission necessarily requires content-based decisions by
school authorities that would be inappropriate outside the educa-
tional setting.
Public schools are vitally important "in the preparation of indi-
viduals for participation as citizens.""' Schools serve as vehicles
for "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system."' 1 2 Therefore, "local school
boards must be permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum
in such a way as to transmit community values . ... "113 Schools
possess "a legitimate and substantial ... interest in promoting re-
spect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or
political.""' 4
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,"' the Supreme Court em-
phasized that the first amendment rights of students in public
schools "are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
109. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685
(1986)).
110. Id. at 266.
111. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
112. Id. at 77.
113. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 10).
114. Id. at 864.
115. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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in other settings. 11 6 The Court said, "A school need not tolerate
student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mis-
sion .... 1 117 The school may regulate speech "even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.""' 8
First amendment rules in the public schools must be "applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment.""19
Similarly, the special first amendment standards for secondary
and elementary schools reflect the unique institutional function of
school facilities in the community at large: School facilities are dif-
ferent from streets, sidewalks, parks, courthouse plazas, municipal
auditoriums, and other public buildings and spaces. Schools have
an interest in fastidious neutrality far more intense than most
other governmental enterprises. As the Supreme Court recently ex-
plained, "'In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out
divisive forces than in its schools.' ",120
Schools have a powerful interest in rising above religious and po-
litical contests, an interest borne of the tension that exists between
the pluralism of the student population and the inculcation inher-
ent in the school's educational mission. Precisely because public
schools warmly embrace all American children, without regard to
religion, race, ethnicity, or politics, and then transmit knowledge,
skills and civic values to that diverse group, schools must guard
jealously against both the practice and appearance of religious, ra-
cial, or political partisanship.' 2 '
E. Government Employment
Government employment cases offer yet another perspective on
the cutting edge of doctrine concerning conditions placed on public
affiliation. Two discrete strands of precedent have developed gov-
erning public employment and free speech, one involving political
patronage systems, and the other involving disciplinary retaliations
116. Id. at 682.
117. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Fraser, 478
U.S. at 685).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
120. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (quoting McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
121. See id. at 584; Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985).
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against employees for the content of their speech. The cases are
rich in their complexity.
1. The patronage cases
In Elrod v. Burns,'122 the Court struck a blow against the politi-
cal patronage system in Chicago and surrounding Cook County,
where the practice of patronage had been deeply ingrained for de-
cades. The Court held that Richard Elrod, the newly elected Dem-
ocratic Sheriff of Cook County, could not come into office and be-
gin firing Republicans. 123 The Court did not ban patronage
dismissals completely, but rather seemed to be searching for some
principle that would separate public positions in which party affili-
ation is a legitimate prerequisite and positions in which it is not. 24
The "policymaking" or "confidential" character of the position
seemed to be a plausible dividing line. No one could seriously
maintain, for example, that a President may not treat party affilia-
tion as a condition for appointment to his Cabinet. The Court in
Elrod, however, produced no majority opinion on this point.12
In Branti v. Finkel,12 the Court tried again, this time producing
a majority opinion that articulated the limits of patronage firings.
The Court eschewed the "policymaking" or "confidential" quality
of the job as the touchstone for measuring the constitutionality of
patronage because such labels were both underinclusive and over-
inclusive. 11 Some nonconfidential, nonpolicymaking positions
might be legitimate nominees for requiring a particular policy affil-
iation. The Court cited as an example election laws that require
two election judges at each voting place, one from each party. 2 s
On the other hand, the Court noted, not all policymaking jobs
could require political affiliation: The Court said that a state uni-
versity could not require the head football coach be of a particular
party.
129
122. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
123. Id. at 373.
124. Id. at 372.
125. Id. at 349, 374, 376.
126. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
127. Id. at 518.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Unfortunately, the test the Court adopted in Branti was not par-
ticularly informative. To justify party affiliation as a legitimate
condition on employment, the public agency involved must
"demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement
for the effective performance of the public office involved."'130 This
opaque and conclusory standard did little more than establish that
policymaking and confidentiality were not to be the dispositive in-
quiries-though they could still remain probative of whether, in
the particular circumstances, the nature of the public agency and
the nature of the position could require party loyalty. In Branti,
the job was that of assistant public defender. The Court held that
partisan political interests bore no relation to the effectiveness of
the assistant public defender as an attorney, and that the pa-
tronage dismissal was thus invalid.131
The Elrod and Branti decisions strike at the heart of the right-
privilege distinction, reinforcing the Sherbert v. Verner'32 line of
cases by establishing that, at least in some circumstances, the sur-
render of speech interests may not be exacted as a condition of
employment. Tensions in the area persist, however. Elrod and
Branti are convincing on their facts. On the other hand, a public
employee should not be permitted to secure tenure by the clever
strategy of criticizing supervisors and then crying violation of the
first amendment when fired. And what if the government does not
attempt to pick and choose among political parties, but rather
bans all significant political activity? Does the state interest in
keeping its civil service from being politicized allow it to be an
"equal opportunity discriminator"?
In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,33 the Court upheld a
challenge to the Hatch Political Activity Act,1'3 which bars certain
federal government employees from engaging in active politics.
The Court reaffirmed Mitchell in United States Civil Service
130. Id.
131. Id. at 520.
132. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
133. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1988) (for the original versions of the Hatch Act at issue in Mitch-
ell, see Act of August 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147; Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat.
767).
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Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,13 5 holding
that federal employees may be prohibited from participating in
"plainly identifiable acts of political management and political
campaigning. '"1 6
By sanitizing the civil service of partisan political activity, the
government increases public confidence in the neutrality of deci-
sionmaking and helps to insure that the apparatus of government
does not exert "ideological spin control" on the declared policies of
Congress or the President, but rather administers the law neutrally
to effectuate congressional and legislative directives.
2. The retaliation decisions
In Pickering v. Board of Education,1 3 7 the Court faced the con-
stitutionality of a school board's dismissal of a high school teacher
for openly criticizing the Board of Education on its allocation of
funds between the school's athletic programs and its academic pro-
grams. 18 Was this an act of insubordination deserving a stiff disci-
plinary response, or was this a teacher/citizen speaking out on is-
sues of public concern? Is the high school a command and control
environment, with the Board at the height of the command pyra-
mid, or is it a more open educational community in which the
teachers retain a right to attack prevailing policy? The Court held
that the teacher's statements were matters of legitimate public
concern upon which free and open debate was vital to informed
decisionmaking by the electorate, and that the Board's dismissal of
the teacher thus violated the first amendment. 9
In Connick v. Myers,40 the Court dealt with the free speech of
employees on matters not relating to general discussion of matters
of public interest or concern, but on matters of "insubordination"
within the hierarchy of the agency. The case involved Harry Con-
nick, the District Attorney for Orleans Parish, Louisiana, and
Sheila Myers, an Assistant District Attorney on Connick's staff. A
135. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
136. Id. at 567.
137. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
138. Id. at 566-67.
139. Id. at 571-74.
140. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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dispute between Connick and Myers arose when Connick tried to
transfer Myers to a different section of the criminal court. Myers
prepared and distributed to the other assistants in the office a
questionnaire concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the
need for a grievance committee, their level of confidence in superi-
ors, and whether they felt pressure from their superiors to work in
political campaigns. Connick fired Myers, declaring the question-
naire an act of "insubordination. ' '141
The Supreme Court upheld the termination.'42 Justice White
noted that "[f]or most of this century, the unchallenged dogma
was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions
placed upon the terms of employment-including those which re-
stricted the exercise of constitutional rights.' 1 43 After acknowledg-
ing the Holmes position and the persistency of the right-privilege
distinction, however, Justice White explicitly rejected the distinc-
tion as a legitimate framework for analysis."4
Yet Myers lost her case. The Court introduced a dichotomy be-
tween speech on matters of "public" concern and speech on mat-
ters of "private" concern. "When employee expression cannot be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight
by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."'"
In Rankin v. McPherson,146 the Supreme Court had before it the
issue of whether an employee in a Texas county constable's office
could be fired for stating, upon hearing the news bulletin that
someone had attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan,
"If they go for him again, I hope they get him.' 147 Ardith McPher-
son was a 19-year-old black woman working in the constable's of-
fice in Harris County, Texas. The constable is an elected law en-
forcement official. All employees of the constable's office are
technically "deputy constables," whatever their actual job duties.
141. Id. at 141.
142. Id. at 154.
143. Id. at 143.
144. Id. at 144.
145. Id. at 146.
146. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
147. Id. at 380.
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McPherson had a desk job, typing court papers into a computer
and maintaining certain computerized court records; she was not a
commissioned peace officer, did not wear a uniform, was not au-
thorized to make arrests, and did not carry a gun.
148
When the news came over the radio that the President had been
shot, McPherson spoke to a co-worker, Lawrence Jackson, who was
also her boyfriend, about the shooting.14 9 They talked about how
President Reagan had not been a friend of blacks or the poor, and
about his "cutting back medicaid and food stamps" and "welfare
and CETA."' 50 McPherson said, "[Y]eah, welfare and CETA...
shoot, if they go for him again, I hope they get him."' 1 This state-
ment was overheard by another deputy, and when reported to
superiors, McPherson was fired.'52
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court addressed the constitu-
tional tension that never seems to go away. Marshall observed that
"[i]t is clearly established that a State may not discharge an em-
ployee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of speech.' 5 3 On the other hand, he
pointed out, "Public employers are employers, concerned with the
efficient function of their operations; review of every personnel de-
cision made by a public employer could, in the long run, hamper
the performance of public functions.' 54
In resolving this tension in McPherson's case, the Court first ap-
plied the test from Pickering and Connick, asking whether the
speech embraced issues of public concern.'5 5 Because the life or
death of the President is obviously a matter of acute public inter-
est, the Court reasoned, that test is satisfied. The Court then bal-
anced the state's interest in efficiency against the intrusion on free
speech incident to any termination based on expression about pub-
lic issues.'56 The state argued that law enforcement offices are spe-
148. Id. at 380-81.
149. Id. at 381.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 382.
153. Id. at 383.
154. Id. at 384.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 388-92.
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cial, that respect for law and order is a necessary condition for em-
ployment, and that the state may reasonably demand that its law
enforcement personnel not voice approval of anarchic violence
against the person of the President of the United States.' Anyone
who would advance the viewpoint that the President should be
shot and killed is unworthy of employment in a law enforcement
agency.
The state's argument in McPherson was hardly frivolous; cer-
tainly at some point on the spectrum of law enforcement positions,
adherence to the notion of the rule of law is a legitimate job quali-
fication. Surely, for example, the police department could fire a pa-
trol officer for stating publicly that roughing up drug suspects gra-
tuitously, shooting to kill looters, and breaking into suspects'
homes illegally are good police practices. Surely too, the first
amendment would not prohibit the termination of a narcotics
detective who announced he hopes drug kingpins assassinate the
mayor so that someone with a more enlightened drug enforcement
policy will succeed him. The government may appropriately de-
mand that law enforcement officers respect due process and are
not vigilantes.
In McPherson, however, the Court stated that it "cannot believe
that every employee in Constable Rankin's office, whether com-
puter operator, electrician, or file clerk, is equally required, on pain
of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being inter-
preted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be
unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency.' 15 8 At
some point the concerns of respect for lawful process are so re-
moved from the employee's job function that they lose any gravita-
tional pull whatsoever on the employee's job. McPherson was a
computer processor; her views on the President and her suggestion
that violence against him might be appropriate were probably
never meant to be taken literally. She testified that "I didn't mean
anything by it."' 59 Well, she meant something by it, but it was
probably more an inarticulate disgust and frustration with the
plight of American blacks and the poor, and a sense that this Pres-
157. Id. at 389-90.
158. Id. at 391.
159. Id. at 382.
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ident was not sensitive to their needs. Whatever she meant, how-
ever, there was no causal link between her views and the effective-
ness of the constable's office as a law enforcement agency, no
connection between her spontaneous reaction to a radio bulletin
and public confidence in the agency's respect for law and order.
She was not a frontline officer, and to fire her for her remark was
to fire her for her perceived lack of patriotism or civilized values,
not for her lack of effectiveness as a worker or her undermining of
the mission of the office.
IV. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF CONDITIONS ON AFFILIATION
A. The Problem with All or Nothing Theories
For a brief moment in American constitutional law, the right-
privilege distinction appeared headed for destruction, on grounds
every bit as overly simplistic as the original premises of the right-
privilege distinction itself. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 160 the Court held
that a welfare recipient must be afforded an evidentiary hearing
prior to the termination of benefits. 61 Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, confronted the right-privilege distinction with the oft-
quoted statement that "[i]t may be realistic today to regard wel-
fare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of
the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do
not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property.' ' 62
Although Justice Brennan ostensibly rejected the right-privilege
distinction, in actuality he perpetuated the dichotomy that lay at
the heart of the privilege doctrine by retaining the operative dis-
tinction between vested and nonvested interests-he placed his
analysis, in short, on his faith in "the new property."
In Charles Reich's 1964 article, The New Property,63 cited by
Justice Brennan,"" Reich argued that in light of the "vast, impe-
rial scale" on which government spews forth its jobs, welfare assis-
tance, services, contracts, franchises and licenses, interests in those
government-created sources of wealth should be protected by the
160. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
161. Id. at 261-66.
162. Id. at 262 n.8.
163. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
164. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
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same sorts of procedural safeguards that had always attached to
more conventional forms of property.165
The "new property" concept provided a way of extending pro-
tection to public employment, welfare assistance, contracts and li-
censes that would be consistent within the constitutional frame-
work. The right-privilege distinction would no longer work as the
knee-jerk reaction against claims of constitutional protections for
public benefits, because such benefits could now be included
within the rubric of right rather than privilege. Like one's home,
car, or bank account, one's government job or welfare check could
be labeled property, and with that label safely attached, proce-
dural due process protection seemed secure.
In retrospect, in the years that have elapsed since Reich first
proposed the new property idea, one can make the harsh judgment
that Goldberg, by its use of the new property metaphor, may actu-
ally have stagnated the evolution of intelligent constitutional prin-
ciples governing affiliation with public institutions by tending to
mimic the very conceptual structure it purported to discard.
Having invited the Court to treat government benefits as prop-
erty, for example, the metaphor helped usher in the stilted proce-
dural due process analysis that the Court later adopted in Board of
Regents v. Roth. 66 In that case, the Supreme Court readopted, in
effect, the right-privilege distinction in the context of procedural
due process by requiring that a vested entitlement be involved as a
prerequisite to triggering the protections of the due process
clause.' 67 Of course, Charles Reich never intended his writing to be
turned against recipients of largess, but, ironically, the develop-
ment of the entitlement theory is directly traceable to the new
property analogy.
In The New Property, Reich wrote that "forms of largess ...
must be deemed to be held as of right" and that "[1]ike property,
such largess could be governed by a system of regulation plus civil
or criminal sanctions, rather than a system based upon denial, sus-
pension and revocation.' 1 8 According to Reich, the system should
165. Reich, supra note 163, at 783-87.
166. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
167. See Smolla, supra note 25, at 69-73.
168. Reich, supra note 163, at 785.
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presume that professionals will keep their licenses, and welfare re-
cipients their benefits; "[t]hese interests should be 'vested.' "2169 In
a later article, Reich spoke directly of entitlements:
Society today is built around entitlement. The automobile
dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional
licenses, the worker his union membership, contract, and pen-
sion rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are
devices to aid security and independence. Many of the most im-
portant of these entitlements now flow from government: subsi-
dies to farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and chan-
nels for television stations; long term contracts for defense,
space, and education; social security pensions for individuals.
Such sources of security, whether private or public, are no
longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they
are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity.
It is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by
public policy, have not been effectively enforced.'
This was eloquent philosophy. But it was not really law in the
way that lawyers and judges know law; it was not the creature of
statute, administrative rule, or contractual agreement. The princi-
ple expressed was less legal than moral. Like many powerful moral
norms, it had the strength of purity and the weakness of inno-
cence. The notion of liberty in the administrative-industrial state
must somehow live in the real world, the world of "lawyers, guns,
and money";1" 1 somehow a theory of limits on the right-privilege
distinction must be made intelligible to lawyers and persuasive to
members of the Supreme Court.
B. The Difficulty of Treating Direct and Indirect Regulation
Alike
One of the most promising analytic developments in the demise
of the right-privilege distinction was the discovery that Holmes did
not necessarily have a monopoly on all wisdom about the problem.
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
171. W. Zevon, "Lawyers, Guns and Money," on Excitable Boy album (Elektra-Asylum
1978).
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In his 1968 article The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 172 William Van Alstyne drew on the legal
realist tendencies in Holmes' thought to dispute the legitimacy of
dividing the constitutional landscape between right and nonright.
Holmes' McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford 173 epigram that
"[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman"' 74 clearly re-
flected a positivistic approach to rights; but Holmes himself did
not believe that a right had any a priori existence-it was merely
the "hypostasis of a prophecy . .. that the public force will be
brought to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it.' 171
If Holmes' own understanding of the nature of a "right" is plugged
into the McAuliffe epigram, the epigram is reduced to tautology:
"Because the public force will not be brought to bear upon those
who discharged petitioner, he has no right to be a policeman. And
because petitioner therefore has no right to be a policeman, the
public force will not be brought to bear upon those who discharged
him. "176
Once this view is accepted, the outlines of a coherent general
theory of conditions on affiliation begin to emerge. In a constitu-
tional system in which the power of the government is limited and
the rights of individuals are conditional, decisions become matters
172. Van Alstyne, supra note 21.
173. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
174. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
175. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918); see Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897) ("The primary rights and duties with which jurispru-
dence busies itself... are nothing but prophecies.") [hereinafter Holmes, The Path of the
Law]. The treatment of law as a prediction of what courts will actually do was typical of the
legal realists. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 46 (1930) (Law consists of
"actual law.., a past decision ... or probable law... a guess as to a future decision ....");
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 8 (2d ed. 1951) ("What...
officials do about disputes is . . . the law itself."); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
Cases, 28 COLuM. L. REV. 1014, 1020 (1928) (Legal rules are "but the trappings through
which judgment is passed ....").
176. Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 1460. John Hart Ely has similarly criticized the enti-
tlement doctrine as circular. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 19 (1980) ("It turns out, you
see, that whether it's a property interest is a function of whether you're entitled to it, which
means the Court has to decide whether you're entitled to it before it can decide whether you
get a hearing on the question whether you're entitled to it.").
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of balancing the competing interests.17 That the government is
acting to control behavior indirectly through conditions does not
mean that an entirely different balance will be struck when it acts
directly through the imposition of straightforward penalties on be-
havior. The difficult question becomes whether the balance that is
struck must be automatically the same if it is not to be automati-
cally different. That the government is acting through the carrot
and not the stick may not entirely excuse it from its Bill of Rights'
obligations, but may such action be used as an element of
mitigation?
C. Factoring in Affiliation
Having finally eliminated right-privilege thinking and its tena-
cious hold on the Constitution, one might think that we should
unceremoniously reject the importation of contract or gift analo-
gies in our rebuilt analysis.17 8 Under this approach, the validity of
a condition placed on public sector affiliations would have nothing
whatever to do with notions of consent or waiver; but would be
purely a matter of balancing the government interest behind the
condition against the individual interest being sacrificed.179
The cases discussed in the last section, however, do not seem
bent on rejecting contract or gift theories with the single-minded
fury of a recent convert. They seem rather to be working them-
selves by fits and starts toward a more sensible middle ground.
When government places conditions on affiliation, it wears many
hats: It is "seller" to certain "consumers" of its goods and services;
it is employer to its employees; it is teacher to its students; it is
"manager" for its "taxpayer-stockholders." In at least some of
these relationships, we may well feel it perfectly appropriate to
give government the freedom a private entity enjoys in the private
sector market to strike whatever bargains the market will bear. in
those contexts in which there is some reason for faith in the integ-
177. Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 1456, 1464; see Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New
Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445,
487 (1977).
178. See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on
the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L-. L. REv. 751, 769-71 (1969) (rejecting
the analogical model).
179. Id.
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rity of market mechanisms, we may choose to intervene only when
we think the bargains struck are "unconscionable," but using a
standard of unconscionability far more liberal and interventionist
than would be the case in routine commercial transactions.
The contours of unconscionability, in this sense, may be heavily
guided by the jurisprudence of the Bill of Rights outside the con-
text 6f conditions. Persons may waive their rights contractually,
but we will presume that they do not do so without duress. Gov-
ernment thus is free to bargain on behalf of its citizen-sharehold-
ers, but always by bending over backwards to protect its citizen-
consumers.
This notion of government as "management" for "taxpayer-
shareholders" might be seen also in terms of income redistribution
and risk spreading. If government is encumbered in its dealings by
the requirement that it observe certain constitutional rights that
would not impair institutions in the private sector, then govern-
mental activity becomes more expensive. Employees with due pro-
cess have more job security and cost more to employ than employ-
ees without it. If government must accommodate the free exercise
of religion in dispensing its largess, the costs of accommodation
will become part of the overhead for the largess-dispensing enter-
prise. Taxpayers foot these bills, and so income is transferred from
the general base of taxpayers to the smaller subgroup of individu-
als with whom government engages in transactions.
Because government contact with individuals is ubiquitous, how-
ever, virtually all taxpayers may, at some point, become benefi-
ciaries of these constitutional rules. Any taxpayer may conceivably
find himself or herself in a significant transaction with the govern-
ment in which they are thankful for the Constitution. Some classes
of taxpayers, of course, can count in advance on a special interest
with governmental behavior rules-families employed by govern-
ment agencies, or with children in public schools, for example,
have an entrenched self-interest in constitutional restraints.
Whatever the government employee loses in taxes due to the in-
creased cost of running a civil service subject to the due process
clause is more than regained in the "insurance policy" against arbi-
trary and capricious dismissal that is provided by due process pro-
tection for his or her job.
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Even those Americans without ongoing relations with the gov-
ernment, if they thought about it, might be willing to pay the in-
cremental tax costs of running the country with the less efficient
but more humane restrictions on governmental behavior mandated
by the Bill of Rights, because they never know where the axe
might fall. They too might well prefer the insurance against ran-
dom catastrophic governmental abuse that is to some degree pro-
vided by the Constitution. Thus, the selfish interest of citizen-tax-
payers in paying less into the pot may be offset by the selfish
interest of citizen-victims in knowing that a pot is there to com-
pensate them if the administrative machine improperly runs them
over.
D. A Cross-Reference to the Private Sector
The issues explored here concerning public sector conditions also
need to be explored in the context of the private sector. That ex-
ploration is beyond the purview of this Article, but a brief "cross-
reference" of sorts is nevertheless useful. The reflexive response of
many to any suggestion of limits on private sector conditions relat-
ing to affiliation would be that private organizations present an en-
tirely different problem. The market, it might be said, should be
left alone to determine preferences concerning private sector con-
ditions. Private companies may exert whatever restrictions on their
employees the market will bear. If, for example, corporations find
it a market advantage to give their employees corporate "freedom
of speech" rights equivalent to those of public employees, then
they will give employees those rights. If it is not a market advan-
tage, they will not give employees those rights-either way, the
government has no business attempting to regulate these relations
by fiat.
This line of reasoning, however, is subject to the objection that
the government moves in the labor market too, and presumably
the market could also have been an adequate regulator of govern-
mental conditions. Yet modern constitutional law has moved ag-
gressively to supplant the market in the case of public sector em-
ployment, reflecting a social and legal judgment that the market,
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operating on its own, consistently undervalues constitutionally pro-
tected liberties.180
The question then becomes whether the market also consistently
undervalues civil liberties in the private sector. A superficial an-
swer would be that the private sector is incapable of violating civil
liberties because violations of civil liberties require government ac-
tivity, so-called "state action." '181 In the absence of state action, the
Bill of Rights cannot be violated.
Drawing on the state action requirement, one might then ven-
ture a more clever turn of the screw. Because private companies
cannot violate the Bill of Rights, the private sector is less of a
threat to civil liberties than government agencies. Thus, private
companies are to be preferred to public entities for servicing soci-
ety's needs because the private sector is less dangerous to civil lib-
erty. The state action requirement thus becomes an engine for ad-
vancing Margaret Thatcher-style privatization.
This argument is too clever by half, however, for it mistakes le-
gal reality for reality. Because of the operation of the state action
doctrine, the private sector does not, it is true, violate the law ema-
nating from the Bill of Rights. The private sector in this tautologi-
cal sense is "less dangerous" than the public sector. But the under-
lying restraint on human thought and action is the same whether
applied by the University of North Carolina or its private sector
counterpart down the road, Duke University. Conditions attached
to status as a student or faculty member at Duke will feel the
same, subjectively, as conditions attached to the respective coun-
terparts at North Carolina. The "real life" restraint on freedom is
thus the same for both public and private sectors. The state action
doctrine thus becomes an engine for socialism. If only the state
cannot constitutionally restrict civil liberties, then solicitude for
civil liberties hearkens for the transfer of as many enterprises as
possible under the umbrella of the state. This, however, seems in-
stantly foolish-every bit as foolish as treating state action as an
irresistible Thatcheristic constitutional impulse. Whether to place
the means of production in the public or private sector ought to be
180. See supra text accompanying note 20.
181. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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determined by reference to economic efficiencies, not civil liberties.
Civil liberties may be adequately protected through a far less dras-
tic means than governmental takeover of private enterprise:
Through the operation of law one may simply impose upon private
companies substantive restraints equivalent to those that encum-
ber the government. The private sector remains privately owned
and privately managed, subject to certain publicly imposed restric-
tions-restrictions substantially identical to those that face gov-
ernmental agencies under the Bill of Rights.
All of the evolving principles explored in this Article, in such
contexts as accommodation of the free exercise of religion, public
forums for speech, speech in schools and restrictions on the speech
of employees, would thus be applied uniformly across the spectrum
of American "membership" in institutions, public and private
alike.
The most radical method for achieving this result would be to
abolish the state action doctrine in constitutional law. This would
apply all Bill of Rights liberties instantly to private relations.
What is good enough for the United States would become good
enough for General Motors.
The state action doctrine is such a cornerstone of American con-
stitutional law, however, that imagining a world without it is diffi-
cult for the trained legal mind. The Constitution, we are taught, is
a restraint only on government-it is not a restraint on the people
themselves. The first amendment places limits on what the federal
government or the state of Virginia may do to abridge freedom of
speech, but it has nothing whatsoever to say about what General
Motors or the IBM Corporation may do to abridge the speech of
its employees, or what the employees may do to abridge the speech
of one another. The one notable exception is the thirteenth amend-
ment, the only provision of the Constitution not bound to the state
action requirement. 182 The thirteenth amendment abolished slav-
ery, and the slaves were owned by private businesses, not by states;
the amendment operated directly on the private sector to prohibit
slavery.
In all other instances, however, the Constitution secures individ-
ual liberty by placing limits on what government may do. It is a
182. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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negative document, cast in the language of restraint against offi-
cials. It does not appear to place any affirmative obligations on cit-
izens-individuals are free to vote, but do not have to vote, are
free to speak, but do not have to speak, are free to worship, but do
not have to worship.
The imposition of civil liberties constraints on the private sector
is an act of a fundamentally different character than the imposi-
tion of such constraints on government. When the government is
shackled usually no correlative restraint on anyone else's liberty
occurs. When restraints are placed on private sector activity, how-
ever, such correlative impositions often do exist. If the government
is forbidden from discriminating against blacks in the rental of
governmental housing, for example, the equality and liberty of the
black renters are vindicated, and the government does not suffer.
If we impose the same requirement on a landlord in the private
sector, the equality and liberty of the black renter will also be vin-
dicated. This time, however, there is a correlative victim: The
landlord has had his liberty reduced; his freedom of nonassociation
has been taken away.
Elimination of the state action doctrine does not, to say the
least, appear to be just over the horizon. Over the long march of
constitutional history, however, we have certainly witnessed cata-
clysmic upheavals in doctrine no less jarring, and one can possibly
imagine a constitutional world in, say, 2025, in which no state ac-
tion would be required to trigger Bill of Rights protections. Indeed,
even state action doctrine as we know it today is at times suffi-
ciently latitudinous to sweep in major segments of the private
sector.
Although we are not likely to constitutionalize much of the law
governing restraints on private sector conditions, as a matter of
public policy we may choose to create laws accomplishing the same
results. That epoch, in fact, is already upon us. Since the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 13 we have aggressively extended the equality
principles mandated by the Constitution to employment in the pri-
vate sector-at times imposing even more stringent equality rules
than the Constitution itself imposes on government. State and lo-
183. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to
2000h-6 (1982)).
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cal governments have steadily sought to extend the anti-discrimi-
nation rules of their civil rights acts beyond employers, to private
clubs and organizations. Thus far, attempts by those organizations
to resist the force of these equality rules on grounds that the rules
interfere with their rights of nonassociation have failed.""
Judicial decisions have also tended to blur the public sector/pri-
vate sector dichotomy. Employment at will was once a tough-
minded doctrine that served much the same function as the right-
privilege distinction in constitutional law. A private employee took
his employment "as is," and was forced to attempt to secure any
special protections he or she desired by contracting for them. In
the at-will employment situation, the employee essentially had no
rights reserved and could be fired at the whim, caprice, or malice
of the boss. The law of contracts and the law of torts have devel-
oped in recent years, however, so as to make major inroads on em-
ployment at will in many states."5
In some jurisdictions employees may not be fired in "bad
faith,"186 or for reasons that are "against public policy."' 18 7 Tort
suits for defamation or infliction of emotional distress similarly
184. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the Supreme Court dis-
cussed two types of freedom of association: "freedom of intimate association" and "freedom
of expressive association." Id. at 617-18. Groups with strong claims to freedom of intimate
association tend to be relatively small, exercise a high degree of selectivity, and maintain
seclusion from others as critical aspects of the relationship. Id. at 620. The Court held that
the Jaycees were basically unselective and lacked the attributes that were necessary for rec-
ognition of intimate associational claims. Id. at 619-21. The second type of freedom of asso-
ciation, expressive association, is a freedom incident to the exercise of free speech rights. Id.
at 622-23. The Court in Jaycees held that application of a state's sex discrimination laws to
the group would not impermissibly interfere with that freedom. Id. at 623-28.
The Court next visited the freedom of association problem in Board of Directors of Ro-
tary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). In characterizing the Rotary Club,
the Court noted that although Rotary Clubs take no positions on "public questions," they
do "engage in a variety of commendable service activities" protected by the first amend-
ment. Id. at 548. These sorts of activities, however, pose no serious implications for infringe-
ment of the members' rights of expressive association. Id. at 548-49.
185. See, e.g., Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 552-58 (Okla. 1987) (discussing these
developments in the law of torts and contracts; declining, however, to impose a legal duty on
an employer not to terminate an at-will employee in "bad faith"); Schmidt, Development of
the Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Doctrine, 29 ARiz. L. REv. 295 (1987).
186. Hinson, 742 P.2d at 554 n.17.
187. See, e.g., Boyle v. Vista Eyeware, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Bushko
v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986).
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serve to act as governors on employer conduct.'88 At times, indeed,
the common law seems to have outpaced constitutional law, with
private at-will employees actually enjoying greater quantums of
protection than their public sector counterparts.
V. CONCLUSION
These are serious questions of constitutional law and public pol-
icy. To pose them in 1990 is somewhat unsettling, not so much
because of the content of the questions, but because of the alarm-
ing possibility that no one really cares. Conditions attached to in-
stitutional affiliations are worrisome only if one has significant in-
stitutional affiliations. To lower class Americans who all too often
seem hopelessly and incorrigibly within an intractable cycle of de-
caying urban and dirt-poor rural poverty, the only conditions to
worry about are those the government imposes on the receipt of
welfare. Middle and upper class Americans may be increasingly in-
clined to see it as part of their mandate to set conditions for the
poor that are likely to induce industry and self-reliance. "Get off
drugs, stay in school, acquire a skill, stop having kids, and make
yourselves contributing members of society, or else we'll cut you
off." Middle and upper class Americans may similarly see the con-
ditions placed on their own lives as bargains well struck in ex-
change for the money and esteem that their institutional affilia-
tions bring them,°a sort of Bill of Rights dressed for success.
How should a kinder, gentler America, to use President George
Bush's gentle and compassionate invocation, treat institutional af-
filiation's leverage on controlling social behavior? Or is it foolish to
even pose the question, foolish to consider any possibility other
than laissez faire: Government agencies and private corporations
may impose whatever conditions the market will bear. As America
drifts, passionlessly, into the 1990s, it seems unwilling to take civil
liberties seriously. Perhaps the source of the apathy is the continu-
ing hangover of eight years of the anesthetizing "aw shucks" good
feeling under President Ronald Reagan; perhaps it is an imitation
of Great Britain after World War II, a sense of a declining empire
in which all the action in the world is elsewhere-Tieneman
188. See R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 15.01-.07 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
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Square, Glasnost in the Kremlin, a Polish government run by the
Solidarity trade union; perhaps it is the overspent baby-boomer
nostalgia of Chablis, brie and Woodstock revivals, in which talk of
IRA means Individual Retirement Account and not Irish Republi-
can Army. As we enter the last decade of this century, the country
seems curiously ambivalent about its Bill of Rights. Indeed, the
country seems ambivalent about the century it is giving up and the
century it is about to start; it seems ready to forgive and forget the
twentieth century, yet its imagination is not engaged by the
twenty-first. However soothing the country may find George
Bush's good-natured, crinkly crooked smile, it is hardly the stuff
that forges future direction for a brave new century. America is a
country poised "to party ['til] it's 1999. ' '189
Some unknown event, some upheaval, some cataclysmic tragedy,
will undoubtedly move us, galvanize us, shape our consciousness in
the way that Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement,
the assassination of John Kennedy, King and Bobby Kennedy, and
the War in Vietnam all moved us. History is restless; with or with-
out our consent it will not countenance our mood of aimless drift.
Inevitably, the pre-baby-boomers, baby-boomers and post-baby-
boomers who will usher the country into the next century in com-
bined partnership will be forced to face, as all generations of
Americans are forced to face, those fundamental, vexing and cajol-
ing questions posed forever by the Bill of Rights. Just what will
our concept of civil liberties be in the next century? What will the
Bill of Rights mean to us? When these questions are finally thrust
upon us and taken up for deep and sober thought, we will be
forced to contemplate what may in fact be the civil liberties strug-
gle of the future: the fight to carve out meaningful spheres of indi-
vidual liberty in the vast administrative-industrial state.
189. Prince, "1999," on 1999 album (Warner Bros. 1982).
1990]
